The Electoral Act 2026: Rewriting the Rules of Nigeria's Electoral Process

Nigeria's electoral framework has entered a new phase with the enactment of the Electoral Act, 2026. The legislation introduces significant changes that will affect not only the conduct of elections, but also the internal administration of political parties, candidate nomination, electoral technology, campaign finance and the litigation of election disputes.

Nigeria's electoral framework has entered a new phase with the enactment of the Electoral Act, 2026 (the "Act") on 18 February 2026. The legislation repeals the Electoral Act, 2022 and establishes a new statutory framework for the conduct of Federal, State and Federal Capital Territory Area Council elections.

The timing is significant. With Nigeria moving towards the 2027 general elections, the Act introduces a number of changes that will affect not only the conduct of elections, but also the internal administration of political parties, candidate nomination, electoral technology, campaign finance and the litigation of election disputes. Some of its reforms seek to address longstanding weaknesses in Nigeria's electoral system. Others, however, raise difficult questions about constitutional supremacy, access to justice, proportionality and the practical enforceability of electoral regulation.

The Act should therefore be understood not simply as a replacement for the 2022 legislation, but as a significant recalibration of the legal relationship between voters, political parties, candidates, INEC and the courts.

1. Digital Party Membership Registers: Bringing Party Membership into the Open

One of the most consequential reforms concerns the internal administration of political parties. Section 77 requires every registered political party to maintain a digital register of its members, containing information including the member's name, sex, date of birth, address, State, Local Government Area, ward, polling unit, National Identification Number and photograph. The register must exist in both hard and soft copies, and members are to be issued membership cards.

The requirement becomes particularly important in the context of party primaries. A political party must submit its membership register to the Independent National Electoral Commission ("INEC" or the "Commission") at least 21 days before its primaries, congresses or conventions. Only persons whose names appear on the submitted register may vote or be voted for, and the party is prohibited from using a different register for those processes. Failure to submit the register within the prescribed period renders the party ineligible to field a candidate for the relevant election.

This is a substantial compliance obligation. The provision appears designed to address one of the recurring sources of intra-party litigation: disputes over who constitutes the legitimate membership of a political party and, consequently, who is entitled to participate in its internal electoral processes. By requiring a single, verifiable register to be submitted to INEC before the relevant party exercise, the Act seeks to reduce the possibility of membership lists being altered, supplemented or substituted for the purpose of a particular primary.

But the severity of the sanction deserves attention. A failure to comply with what may, in some circumstances, be an administrative requirement can potentially prevent an entire political party from presenting a candidate. The provision therefore creates a tension between regulatory compliance and democratic participation. The practical question will be whether the courts will interpret the provision strictly, particularly where non-compliance is technical, inadvertent or attributable to circumstances that do not undermine the integrity of the primary itself.

2. A New Boundary Between Political Parties and the Courts?

Perhaps the most legally contentious provisions of the Act concern judicial intervention in the internal affairs of political parties. Section 83(5) provides that, subject to subsection (3), no court in Nigeria shall entertain jurisdiction over any suit or matter pertaining to the internal affairs of a political party. Where proceedings are brought contrary to the provision, the Act further restricts interim and interlocutory relief and requires an accelerated hearing. It also provides for minimum costs of ₦10 million against the counsel who instituted the action and another ₦10 million against the plaintiff or applicant, in addition to certain costs payable to the Commission where applicable.

The provision is striking because political party disputes have historically generated significant electoral litigation in Nigeria. The Act appears to pursue a clear policy objective: to prevent the courts from becoming the primary arena for resolving every disagreement arising from party leadership, nomination and internal administration. Yet the constitutional implications are substantial.

Section 4(8) of the Constitution provides, among other things, that neither the National Assembly nor a State House of Assembly shall enact a law that ousts or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law or judicial tribunal established by law. Consequently, the scope and constitutional validity of section 83(5) are likely to attract serious judicial consideration. Indeed, the provision has already generated litigation. In June 2026, a civil society organisation commenced proceedings challenging sections 83(5) and 86(6)(b), contending that they unlawfully restrict judicial jurisdiction in political party disputes.

The controversy is therefore no longer theoretical. The courts may ultimately be required to determine how far Parliament can go in restricting judicial intervention in party affairs while remaining consistent with the constitutional allocation of judicial power.

3. Direct Primaries or Consensus: The End of Indirect Primaries?

The Act makes another important intervention in the nomination of political candidates. Section 84(2) provides that the nomination of candidates by political parties shall be conducted through direct primaries or consensus. Indirect primaries, which were recognised under the 2022 framework, are consequently no longer available as a statutory mode of nomination.

The policy rationale is understandable. Under a direct primary, participation is broadened beyond a comparatively small group of delegates. The model potentially reduces the influence of delegates who may be susceptible to inducement and gives a larger proportion of party members a direct role in choosing candidates.

However, direct primaries are not without practical difficulties. They require accurate membership registers, substantial logistical preparation and credible mechanisms for identifying eligible party members. The Act therefore makes the integrity of section 77's membership register particularly important. If only registered members may participate in a direct primary, the reliability of the membership database becomes fundamental to the legitimacy of the nomination process.

Consensus remains available—but with safeguards

The Act does not completely eliminate consensus arrangements. Section 87 requires a political party adopting a consensus candidate to obtain the written consent of all cleared aspirants, indicating their voluntary withdrawal and endorsement of the consensus candidate. Where the necessary consent cannot be obtained, the party must revert to direct primaries.

This is significant because consensus can be both a mechanism for party unity and a potential vehicle for elite control. The statutory requirement for written consent attempts to distinguish genuine consensus from unilateral candidate imposition. Whether it will achieve that objective will depend on how the provision operates in practice.

4. A New Role for INEC in Party Regulation

The Act substantially reinforces INEC's supervisory role over political parties. Section 82 requires political parties to give the Commission at least 21 days' notice of conventions, congresses, conferences and other specified meetings. INEC may attend and observe such proceedings, including meetings for the election of party executives, nomination of candidates and approval of mergers. Failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements renders the relevant primaries, convention, congress or conference invalid.

The Act consequently moves beyond treating INEC merely as an election-day management institution. The Commission is increasingly positioned as a regulator of the pre-election environment, particularly in relation to party organisation, candidate nomination and compliance with electoral legislation. This creates an important compliance responsibility for political parties. Internal party processes can no longer be treated exclusively as matters of private party administration where the Act expressly subjects them to statutory oversight.

5. Political Appointees and Internal Party Elections

An additional innovation is contained in section 88(1), which provides that a political appointee at any level cannot serve as a voting delegate or be voted for at a political party's convention, congress or primaries for the nomination of candidates. The provision appears directed at reducing the influence of persons holding governmental appointments over internal party nomination processes. Its broader objective is to create greater separation between public office and party nomination machinery. Whether this will substantially alter the dynamics of internal party politics remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it reflects the Act's broader attempt to regulate the circumstances in which political influence may be exercised within party structures.

6. Campaign Finance: Higher Ceilings, Greater Disclosure

Campaign finance is another area in which the 2026 Act introduces significant changes. Section 92 establishes the following maximum expenditure limits: Presidential — ₦10 billion; Governorship — ₦3 billion; Senatorial — ₦500 million; House of Representatives — ₦250 million; State House of Assembly — ₦100 million; Area Council Chairmanship — ₦100 million; Area Council Councillorship — ₦10 million. The Act also limits an individual or other entity to a maximum donation of ₦500 million to a candidate. Breaches attract statutory penalties, while accountants who falsify or facilitate the falsification of expenditure or donation records may face a fine of at least ₦5 million, imprisonment for up to three years, or both.

The increase in the expenditure ceilings, particularly the ₦10 billion presidential limit, reflects the enormous cost of contemporary political campaigning. It also raises an important normative question: does recognising higher campaign expenditure merely reflect economic realities, or does it risk further entrenching the influence of money in Nigerian politics? The answer will depend considerably on enforcement.

Importantly, the Act does not stop at prescribing expenditure limits. Political parties must submit audited returns of their election expenses, with those returns required to disclose expenditure and contributions. The Commission is also required to make audited returns available for public inspection. The effectiveness of campaign finance regulation will therefore depend less on the statutory figures than on the capacity and willingness of regulatory institutions to audit, investigate and sanction violations.

7. BVAS and the Statutory Recognition of Electoral Technology

Technology occupies a central position in the new electoral framework. Section 47(2) provides that the Presiding Officer shall use the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) or another technological device prescribed by the Commission to verify, confirm or authenticate the particulars of an intending voter.

The provision is important because it places electronic voter accreditation within the statutory architecture of the electoral process rather than leaving its legal significance primarily to administrative regulations and guidelines. The Act also makes provision for what happens when the accreditation technology fails. Where the deployed technology fails at a polling unit and a replacement device is not provided, the Commission is required to schedule another election within 24 hours where it is satisfied that the affected polling unit could substantially affect the final result.

The legislation therefore attempts to address one of the practical difficulties that emerged from the increasing reliance on election technology: what is the legal consequence of technological failure?

8. Electronic Transmission and the National Electronic Register of Election Results

The technological reforms extend beyond accreditation. Section 60 requires the Presiding Officer to electronically transmit polling-unit results to the IREV portal after the prescribed result form has been signed and stamped. Importantly, however, the Act recognises a communication-failure exception: where electronic transmission becomes impossible because of communication failure, the signed and stamped Form EC8A remains the primary source for collation and declaration.

The Act also requires INEC to maintain a National Electronic Register of Election Results, containing polling-unit and collated results in electronic form. Certified copies of those results may be obtained in printed or electronic format. This could prove particularly valuable in election litigation. A centralised electronic repository of polling-unit results has the potential to improve access to electoral records and make the evidentiary process surrounding disputed results more efficient. It also reinforces the importance of the polling-unit result as the foundational building block of the electoral collation process.

9. A Narrower Gateway to Election Petitions

Perhaps the most consequential reform for election litigation is section 138. Under the 2026 Act, an election may be challenged on two principal grounds: (1) that the election was invalid because of corrupt practices or non-compliance with the Act; or (2) that the returned candidate was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes. Notably absent is the express ground previously contained in section 134(1)(a) of the 2022 Act—that the person whose election was questioned was not qualified to contest the election.

The omission has already generated substantial legal debate. Commentators have described it as potentially shifting qualification disputes from the post-election petition stage to the pre-election stage. The practical consequences could be significant. Qualification requirements for elective office are constitutional matters. The Electoral Act cannot override the Constitution. The difficult question, therefore, is whether the new provision merely regulates the forum and timing in which qualification questions may be raised, or whether it creates an unconstitutional gap where a candidate whose constitutional qualification was not effectively challenged before the election subsequently wins. This is likely to become one of the most important areas of electoral jurisprudence under the new Act.

The concern is heightened by the fact that the Act also provides penalties where a political party or candidate challenges an election on grounds outside those specified in section 138. The provision imposes minimum penalties of ₦5 million on counsel and ₦10 million on the petitioner. The message from the legislature is unmistakable: election litigation is intended to operate within a tightly defined statutory framework. Whether that framework is constitutionally sustainable will ultimately be for the courts to determine.

10. Election Results and the Evidentiary Architecture of Future Litigation

An interesting feature of the Act is the greater integration of technological accreditation and electronic result transmission into the legal process for determining disputed results. Where a result is challenged during collation, the Act contemplates consideration of the original polling-unit result, accreditation data transmitted from the polling unit, and electronically transmitted votes and results.

This is potentially transformative for election litigation. The evidentiary battle in future election petitions may increasingly move from general allegations of irregularity towards data-driven reconstruction of what occurred at individual polling units. For counsel involved in electoral disputes, this will require greater familiarity not only with electoral law and procedure but also with the integrity, retrieval and forensic analysis of electronic electoral data.

11. What the Act Means for the 2027 Elections

The 2026 Act will be tested almost immediately. Political parties will need to review their constitutions, guidelines, membership databases and internal nomination procedures. Aspirants will need to understand the new rules governing primaries. Candidates and parties will have to pay greater attention to campaign finance and disclosure obligations. INEC will face the task of implementing a more technologically and administratively demanding electoral regime.

For election lawyers, the Act changes the litigation landscape considerably. The importance of pre-election litigation, statutory compliance and contemporaneous preservation of electoral evidence is likely to increase. Parties and candidates cannot afford to wait until after an election before addressing defects that could and should have been challenged earlier. The narrowing of petition grounds also means that the framing of an election petition will become even more important. A complaint must be anchored firmly within the statutory grounds recognised by section 138.

Conclusion: Reform, Opportunity and Constitutional Questions

The Electoral Act 2026 is an ambitious attempt to modernise Nigeria's electoral system. Its reforms are wide-ranging: digital party membership registers, stricter regulation of party primaries, direct primaries and consensus nominations, enhanced INEC oversight, statutory recognition of electronic voter accreditation, electronic transmission of results, a national electronic results register, revised campaign finance limits and a narrower framework for election petitions. Some of these reforms strengthen transparency and institutional accountability. Others may substantially alter the relationship between political parties, electoral regulators and the judiciary.

The most important question is therefore not whether the Act introduces significant reforms—it plainly does—but whether those reforms can be implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution, democratic participation and the rule of law. The provisions concerning judicial jurisdiction over party affairs and the restricted grounds for election petitions are particularly likely to receive sustained judicial attention. Their interpretation may shape not only the 2027 elections but the future development of Nigerian electoral jurisprudence.

Ultimately, electoral legislation can provide the architecture for credible elections, but legislation alone cannot guarantee them. The effectiveness of the Electoral Act 2026 will depend on the integrity of political parties, the independence and institutional capacity of INEC, effective enforcement, responsible litigation and, above all, respect for the constitutional rights of voters and candidates. As Nigeria approaches the 2027 general elections, the Electoral Act 2026 will therefore serve as both a regulatory framework and a constitutional stress test for the country's democratic institutions.

Lex Firma LP provides legal, regulatory and strategic advisory services in electoral matters, constitutional litigation, political party disputes and election petitions. We continue to monitor developments in Nigeria's electoral jurisprudence and provide practical insight into the legal framework governing the country's democratic process.